Veneration of the saints has been a hallmark of the Catholic tradition from its earliest days. These virtuosi of the Christian life, honored in the liturgy and a mainstay of popular devotion, have not received much scholarly attention from theologians until recent times. Part of this neglect can be explained by the fact that the tradition about the saints is inextricably tied to a hagiographical literature that did not seem amenable to the more austerely precise formulations of school theology. The old clerical quip "you lie like a second nocturn" reflected the conviction that this tradition, with its embroidery of the fantastic, stretched the credulity of the serious theologian. The hagiographical tradition, as a consequence, became the province of the folklorist, the antiquarian, the literary critic, and the historical sleuth (the best of the Bollandists possessed all of these skills).
main characters, a student of hagiography who was in close consultation with the Bollandists 2 ) and more concerned with the saintly tradition as it impinges on, and is cognate with, theological reflection.
For that reason, I will simply note in passing that a good number of important historical studies of the saintly tradition have appeared in this decade 3 and refer back to them as they shed light on the three areas to which this review essay addresses itself. We will consider the following broad areas of research: (1) the problem of defining who and what a saint is; (2) the role of saints in theological reflection; and (3) the place of saints in the arena of comparative theology. We will then finish with some general conclusions. This survey will not mention biographies of saints unless they are directly relevant to our more restricted discussion.
WHO OR WHAT IS A SAINT?
If we leave aside the New Testament practice, most frequent in the Pauline corpus, of designating the members of the ekklêsia as saints (hagioi), the question we pose seems easily answered, at least from within the Roman Catholic tradition: the saint is any person who is recognized as such by the Church in an official way (canonization) with the result that the person may be the legitimate object of liturgical cultus in the universal calendar of the sanctoral cycle or in the same cycle for a particular region or religious order.
Such an understanding of saints could make legitimate appeal to the implied definition in canon 1187 of the New Code of Canon Law: "Only those servants of God may be venerated by public cult who have been numbered by ecclesiastical authority among the Saints or the Blessed." It could appeal, further, to the previous canon (1186), which speaks of the saints both in terms of edification and also, more pointedly, in terms of their powers of intercession, mainly in the context of their legitimate cult in the liturgy.
The problem with a definition like the one given above (quite apart from the fact that there were no papal canonizations before the tenth century for the many saints who are venerated in the Church but who were never formally canonized, e.g. the Apostles) is that it cannot account for the living saints among us. "Saints" is an appellation widely used in the Church, albeit unofficially, for those persons who are genuine models of holiness, but who enjoy neither public nor, in many cases, private cultus. For example, if one were to ask many committed church persons who makes a greater impact on their lives, the recent martyrs in El Salvador or the late Dorothy Day or Thomas Merton or Mother Teresa of Calcutta as compared with, say, some of the recently canonized members of religious orders, the answer would obviously be the former rather than the latter.
There is, thus, a perceived discrepancy between the way saints are officially characterized by the Church and the way they are popularly perceived in the Church by many people. One issue that we must consider, then, is the degree to which we can call these noncanonized persons "saints."
There is a further issue. In the early history of saints, the single most important of the criteria used for the establishment of the cult of saints was their thaumaturgical powers exhibited both during their lives and, more importantly, after their deaths. 4 That important criterion still hovers over the canonization process in the requirement that narrative instances of miracles accompany any petition for can- onization unless the candidate is patently a martyr who dies on account of odium fidei or an exception is made by the pope.
5
There is nothing per se objectionable about the notion that sanctity should include the miraculous. After all, such a conjunction of sanctity/ thaumaturgy has a long history in the Church. But, judging from most writing today, insistence on the miraculous seems the most likely reason why there is a discrepancy between what the official Church calls sanctity and what the popular estimation of a saint is. In many cases, our notion of the saint does not necessarily involve the miraculous. We might expect miracles from Padre Pio, but from John Henry Newman? One could argue, for instance, that they are different kinds of saints; hence, again, the problem of definition or, at the very least, discrimination about what kind of saint we are considering.
Finally, it is useful to offer a distinction made famous by Pierre Delooz: the distinction between real saints and constructed saints.
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Real saints are those historical persons who had an actual life and played a real part in the economy of salvation either as part of the biblical tradition (e.g., the mother of Mary) or in subsequent history (Saint Anthony of Padua), as contrasted with the development of a social pattern of religiosity constructed through pious embroidery (the legend of Saint Anne) or through the development of devotional practices tangentially connected to a person (Saint Anthony's bread). There was, to cite one more example, an apostle Jude (real) who later becomes a patron saint of impossible situations (constructed), just as there was an unnamed martyr (possibly real) who later acquired a reputation as a ferryman and was constructed into a Saint Christopher. What is obvious, however, is that a Francis of Assisi is a saint for the Church in a much different manner than a constructed saint like, for example, Saint George. One might hazard a rule of thumb: constructed saints are more commonly seen as intercessors or emblematic figures, while real saints are primarily seen as paradigmatic models who also function, to a greater or lesser degree, as intercessors and/or loci of power.
The problem, then, is this: How does one define a saint so as to take into account the many diverse usages that spring from the various ways we have used the word "saint" in the historical tradition? What is common to a Saint George (a constructed saint), to a Teresa of Ávila (formally canonized and a real saint), to a pacifist martyr under the Nazis (Franz Jägerstätter) who was never canonized, and to a figure like Mohandas Gandhi, who was not a Christian, that would permit us to attempt a definition? How, in short, do we account for these phenomena-cultus, the miraculous, the role of intercession, and character of life-which seem to constitute sainthood, but which may not be characteristics universally observed in the life of each saint?
Recent writing on this issue has fallen back on the strategy of avoiding a too narrow definition in favor of providing what Wittgenstein has called a "family resemblance," which is to say, a complexus of characteristics ("overlapping and crisscrossing," as Wittgenstein says) which would permit us to think of a class. To that description, heavy in its emphasis on exemplarity, two other characteristics should be added. In the introduction to his interesting volume on saints in world religions John Stratton Hawley singles out three areas where the saint plays a role: (1) as a model, (2) in fellowship, and (3) as an aid or conduit of the Holy. 10 The saint not only exemplifies the highest ideals of the believing community (and saints without a community within which they function are rare); saints are also sources of power either through the charisma of their transformed lives, as conduits of a specific form of holiness (e.g. the Russian starets or the spiritual mother/father), 11 or as loci of grace and/or miraculous powers.
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The very notion of imitability, of course, raises its own set of problems. In Christianity there is the commonplace observation that "everyone is called to be a saint." On the other hand, the exemplary value of the saint is diminished if, for example, a saint is best known to us as a wonder-worker whose greatest power rests on acts done after his or her death. To desire to be a thaumaturge, to put it bluntly, would seem to be at best an eccentric, and, on closer examination, an unworthy sort of goal for Christian life. The tension between the mutability of the saint and his/her extraordinary powers is, as Richard Kieckhefer has written, the tension between the saint as exemplar and the saint as other. This tension is not always resolvable.
13
The point that Kieckhefer urges is that the greatest saints have been so singular that it would not always naturally occur to us to use their lives as templates for our own. The singularity of their lives may serve as spurs to further spiritual effort or may function as prophetic judgments on oiir own lives, but it is not immediately clear that we are called upon to imitate them with anything like fidelity to their styles of life.
Thus, then, the saint's otherness can serve as a prophetic judgment on the distance between his or her life and our own. In that sense the saint serves as a standard against which progress in the spiritual life or the life of Christian service can be measured. Or, again, as Karl Rahner noted in an extremely suggestive essay, the saint helps us to see a new or different way in which the gospel can receive life in actual practice.
14 Or, finally, the saint (e.g. Mother Teresa of Calcutta) can reflect the perennial virtues of the Christian tradition, illustrating that they still have vigor. In this later instance, the saint offers us hints for the restoration of values which have been lost or minimized in a particular time, while, in Rahner's construction of it, the saint shows forth the novum of the gospel.
Any broad description of the saint, at least in the Christian tradition, would have to take into account the characteristic of imitability in the wide sense that has been described above. That concept of imitability must exist in some dialectical tension with singularity. Within that tension we might consider the saint's imitability as his/her pedagogical function while saintly singularity might serve as a prophetic gesture to underscore the very facticity of saintliness.
However, we must also factor in the further considerations that saints are honored in the liturgy and that such cultic honor is intimately tied to the doctrine of the communion of the saints. Lumen gentium, we recall, views the saints in terms of their intercessory function, their aid in edification (i.e., building up the Church), as well as their paradigmatic value: they bring "greater consolidation to the holiness of the whole Church," they "do not cease to intercede for us to the Father," and "in a variety of ways [they] contribute to the building up of the Church."
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What Lumen gentium underscores, in short, is that any understanding of the saint must take into account the saint as an eschatological and ecclesiological sign energized by the conviction that "there is a communication of spiritual gifts among all the redeemed, including those who have passed into the life to come." 16 The saints, in short, are for others-both in terms of their imitability and their intercessory powers, but also in terms of their "community building": they add to and enrich the tradition by the expansion of our understanding of the gospel.
A consideration of the communio sanctorum in any discussion of the saints is important in the Catholic tradition, so that we do not detach the saintly narrative from the witness of the community and its sense of solidarity "in the Lord." The common custom of naming institutions for saints or taking a saint's name at baptism is a tacit tribute to this sense of solidarity; the tribute is more explicit in the intercessory prayers of the liturgy and in the naming of the saints, for example, in the eucharistie prayer.
When we take into account all of the above factors it is easy to understand why any sense of what a saint is or may be must be ex- 
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The merit of Coleman's suggested typologies (not meant to be comprehensive) is that they give us a broad calculus of discrimination when the place of the saint in theological reflection is discussed. It is a commonplace in the history of spirituality to identify a given saint with a tradition of prayer or a style of spirituality. We speak correctly of Ignatian prayer or the Theresian little way or Franciscan Christocentrism, and to those traditions we often apply the term "doctrine." What is becoming more common, however, under the impetus of a renewed interest in narrative theology and narratological theory, is an appreciation of how the lives of the saints, understood as icons of the gospel, can help purify our ways of thinking about theology from the perspective of the recuperation of lived experience. One extremely interesting exercise in the recuperation of the saintly life with respect to moral living is Edith Wyschograd's attempt to juxtapose such a life to the insights of postmodern philosophy.
SAINTS AS RESOURCES FOR THEOLOGICAL
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Wyschograd understands the saint to be "one in which compassion for the other, irrespective of cost to the saint, is the primary trait." 21 What she finds most fecund for contemporary moral philosophy is a complex of characteristics associated with the saint that resonates with postmodern concerns. First, there is the narrative character of hagiography which is, as much as the saint's life itself, an event in its own right constituting a field of action and a field for reflection. Secondly, hagiography makes much of corporality in its preoccupation with the demands of, the mastering of, and the transformation of the body. Thirdly, there is the issue of textuality in that "saints' lives are communicated not only in texts but as texts."
22 Finally, the very narrative construction of saints' lives signals historicality in the sense that their lives are presumed rooted in reality so that they may make moral demands on the hearer/reader of those textured lives-they "read" the reader.
Wyschograd's angle of vision is doubly interesting because it dovetails so nicely with the concerns of other writers on the saints who look to their narratives as resources for the re/construction of the moral/ saintly life. As Woodward makes clear in his study of the canonization process, the compilation of a narrative is a key to canonical procedure; there is a concerted effort to see if a life, considered tout court is a saintly life.
Wyschograd's work is closely philosophical. An earlier monograph attempts a three-way dialogue between philosophy, theology, and the tradition of saintliness. panoramic surveys of these voices, but also with substantial monographs which attempt to construct systematic theological worldviews from these writings. We now possess, for example, a fine translation of the Scivias of Hildegard of Bingen (1098-1179) . 27 Equally important, however, is that this extraordinary woman's life and thought has been the subject of careful studies, one of which systematically argues that Hildegard had a vision of theology done in a sophianic mode that repays careful attention both in terms of her own time and with an eye to contemporary reconstructions of theology. 28 In this one instance, typical of a large field of research, we have recovered a life, a "doctrine/' and a new way of envisioning theology.
Similar strategies of retrieval have been employed to link together spiritual theology and male/female friendship 29 or to recover female lives from the prejudices of earlier interpreters. 30 Individual studies of this sort come from the presses monthly, while resources for fuller constructions of a feminist spirituality/theology based on the historical and actual experiences of women are now seen as a desideratum soon to be realized.
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What is true of feminist retrieval studies is also true, mutatis mutandis, of theologies coming from the liberationist base. Eduardo Hoonaert, a church historian writing from Brazil, has made a first attempt at seeing church history from the perspective of the local com- What the editors of this volume finally conclude is that careful historical studies of the category of saint and its analogues is crucial for a clarification of the genre in comparative studies. That conclusion, of course, reinforces the points we have made earlier. If we wish to use the term "saint" in a meaningful fashion, the very elasticity of the term in common coinage demands that we put under the term a range of meaningful typologies of the sort suggested by Coleman so that our discourse is consistent.
Hawley's volume, by contrast, studies sainthood not as a global phenomenon in world religions but from the perspective of the role of the saint as an exemplar/source/energizer of moral action by focussing on specific examples from various religious traditions. The merit of this approach is in its ability to uncover specifics which sharpen the gen-eralizations one makes about the saint. Thus, for example, Hester Gelber's essay on Saint Francis 36 makes the interesting point that beyond the exemplary power of the life of Francis there were elements in his life which set forth statements which could not, or were not, imitable: his walking through a town totally nude was not a practice enjoined on his followers. Thus, in at least this instance, what one sees is not imitability but theatre-and that for reasons of divine pedagogy. Likewise, in a very provocative study, Mark Juergensmeyer traces the complex way in which Gandhi becomes denominated and depicted as a saint in such a way that the notion of sanctity interpenetrates both Christian and Hindu categories. 37 In both instances (that of Francis and Gandhi) one sees the tension between imitability and singularity discussed by Kieckhefer.
Let me cite one last example, since it sheds light on something that is common in the Christian hagiographical tradition. Stanley Tambiath's contribution to this volume studies contemporary Thai Buddhist arahants, who bless amulets which are thought to bring blessings and power to their possessors.
38 These "forest dwellers," conspicuous for their advanced states of contemplation, can reify their charisma through blessed amulets and continue their work through informal networks of disciples and lay devotees. Tambiath compares them to medieval saints who exuded power and to the circles of disciples surrounding hasidic masters in Judaism. What occurred to me, however, in reading his essay, was how close these arahants are to the desert tradition of early Christian eremetical monasticism in their reputed power to charm and pacify animals, their gathering of disciples, their relationship to lay devotees, and in the production of hagiographies which make use of the topoi of parallelism with the imitation of Christ or Buddha.
The work of Tambiath and others cries out for further close comparative study for the light such study might shed on ascetic/spiritual similarities in the world's religions. Such studies would not only advance our understanding of religion but would be a valuable entry into the more complex field of comparative theology. This "narrative remembrance" operates both for the individual (e.g. as a model to be emulated) and for the believing community. The Church, as Lumen gentium centrally insisted, is an eschatological reality; its pilgrim nature means that it is "not yet there." The commemoration of the saints in the liturgy of the Church is not meant simply to honor heros/heroines who are dead, but to proclaim that they are a pledge of our own hope and faith. We are all part of that community, across time and space, who stand in solidarity in the unity of the Spirit.
While it is easy to find fault with the ideological underpinnings of the formal canonization process as it stands today (Delooz, Vauchez, Weinstein, and Woodward are useful here), the ideal process would state symbolically: These are the ones we invoke because they bear witness to the presence of grace in the world; they are the "cloud of 
